Information processing in mood disorders by Roiser, Jonathan P & Sahakian, BJ
  
ORR ARTICLE HANDOVER COVER SHEET 
Article details  
Article title: Information Processing in Mood 
Disorders 
Article ID: oxfordhb-9780199973965-e-16 
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199973965.013.16 
Article author(s): Jonathan Roiser, Barbara J. 
Sahakian 
Author email(s): j.roiser@ucl.ac.uk; bjs-
sec@medschl.cam.ac.uk 
Publishing Group: US-Medicine 
Version details 
Article type (New/Revised): 
Article version (new = blank; 
revised = 1, 2, etc.): 
Version date (new = blank): 
Version summary (new = blank): 
New/replacement art included 
(Y/N): 
[Note: The original (new) 
version of an article should not 
have a version date or a version 
number anywhere in the data.] 
Is article online-only? Yes ☐ No ☒ 
Abstract and keywords provided? Yes ☒ No ☐ 
Art included (if yes, see art log 
for details)? 
OLOP title?: YES 
Handbook details  
Handbook title: The Oxford Handbook of Mood 
Disorders 
Handbook ISBN: 9780199973965 
Online ISBN: 9780199973972 
 
  
Volume editor(s) and contact info: Robert J. DeRubeis 
(derubeis.strunk@gmail.com), Daniel R. Strunk 
(strunk.20@osu.edu) 
Series (if applicable): 
Estimated book publication date: 01 December 2016 
Style and XML details  
Spelling: US 
Level of copy-editing: 
Light | Medium | Heavy 
Style manual: APA 
References style: In-text citations 
Notes style: endnotes 
Style guide provided? Yes ☐ No 
☐ 
Article-specific notes including special characters/fonts/elements: 
Format neutral exceptions: 
All content is format neutral compliant, unless otherwise indicated here. 
Module details  
Module: Psychology 
Module code: ORRPSY 
Module ISBN: 9780199935291 
Update CA (online-only): 
Pre-edit requirements 
Run all OUP standard pre-edit requirements [version 1.4] AND the following 
customizable requirements. 
  
CUSTOMIZABLE TASKS CHOSEN BY PRODUCTION EDITOR/PROJECT 
MANAGER 
3.1 Quotation mark style 
 US quotation mark rules applied: change single to double quotes; periods and 
commas inside double quotes 
 UK quotation mark rules applied: change double quotes to single quotes only 
3.2  UK: Remove full points from contractions in following list: Dr, Ltd, Mrs, Mr, 
Ms, Jr, Revd 
3.3 Change list of attached words and phrases to either UK/US roman or italic 
US list: ROMAN: a posteriori/a posteriori/a priori/ad hoc/ad infinitum/ad 
nauseam/ca./de novo/ e.g./e.g.,/en route/et al./ex parte/ex post facto/fait 
accompli/ibid./i.e./i.e.,/in vitro/in vivo/ 
in situ/joie de vivre/laissez-faire/par excellence/per se/raison d’être/vis-à-vis ITALIC: sic 
 UK list: 
ROMAN: a posteriori/a priori/ad hoc/ad infinitum/ad nauseam/en route/et al./fait 
accompli/ ibid./id./laissez-faire/par excellence/per se/vis-à-vis 
ITALIC: c. (circa)/de novo/ex parte/ex post facto/in situ/joie de vivre/passim/raison 
d’être 
3.4  Change underlined text to italic 
3.5  Change bold to italic 
3.6  Change bold to roman 
3.7 Insert thousand separator for every numeral greater than 9999 
Insert comma as separator; or 
  
Insert thin space as separator 
3.8 Leading zeroes 
 Remove leading zeroes (from numerals such as 0.25) 
 Add leading zeroes (to numerals such as .25) 
3.9  Convert variants of BCE, BC, AD, CE (B.C.E., B.C., A.D., C.E.) to small 
caps in text only 
3.10  Convert variants of AM, PM (A.M., P.M., am, pm) to lowercase with periods 
(a.m./p.m.) in text only 
3.11 Make percent, per cent, % consistent(SUPPLIER: This change is applied in text 
only, tables are excluded.) 
change to “percent” throughout (13 percent) (US, nontechnical usage) 
change to “per cent” throughout (13 per cent) (UK, nontechnical usage) 
change “percent” to % symbol throughout (13%)—close up symbol to number (US, 
technical usage) 
change “per cent” to % symbol throughout (13%)—close up symbol to number (UK, 
technical usage) 
3.12 Ellipsis points style 
 US style: use spaced periods, with nonbreaking space between the periods 
 UK style: use the ellipsis character with a space on either side 
NOTES/REFERENCES 
3.13 Number elision in notes/bibliography/references ONLY 
 Full page ranges (23–29; 100–101; 123–169) 
 Abbreviated page ranges (23–29; 100–101; 123–69) 
  
 Condensed page ranges (23–9; 100–1; 123–69) 
3.14  Convert chapter footnotes to endnotes and set at end of chapter 
3.15  Arrange references in alphabetical order 
 When author/editor is repeated, arrange alphabetically by letter. 
 When author/editor is repeated, arrange chronologically by publication year. 
3.16 Validate URLS (query links that lead to 404 errors) 
 Validate all URLs in document files 
 Validate all URLs in specific file or files: PE/PM to specify file name 
3.17 Postal codes 
 Change postal codes to state abbreviations IN REFERENCES ONLY (NC to N.C., 
CT to Conn.) 
 Change state abbreviations to postal codes IN REFERENCES ONLY (N.Y. to NY, 
Fla. to FL) 
3.18  Add periods to p/pp IN REFERENCES ONLY 
PE/PM: Select the reference style that matches the style used in the text. The pre-edit will 
not change the reference style and will only perform the tasks listed below that are 
associated with that style choice. 
3.19  Author/date 
 Pre-edit checks in-text citations against entries in reference list: missing elements 
queried and listed in reports. 
 Reference list entries checked against in-text citations: missing elements queried 
and listed in reports. 
3.20  Author/date styling with numbered notes in addition to reference list 
  
 Pre-edit checks in-text citations against entries in reference list: missing elements 
queried and listed in reports. 
 Reference list entries checked against in-text citations: missing elements queried 
and listed in reports. 
 In addition: pre-edit checks author/date citations in notes against reference list: 
missing elements queried and listed in reports. 
 Sequential note numbering checked and queried; sequential note callout 
numbering checked and queried. 
3.21  Numbered note references 
 Pre-edit checks sequential note numbering and note callout numbering: 
nonsequential and repeat numbers queried and reported. 
ABSTRACTS AND KEYWORDS 
3.23  Run abstracts and keywords checks (do not select if it has been agreed that 
A&K can be delivered after the pre-edit) 
OPTIONAL CONTENT CHECKS 
3.24 Highlight in yellow the following phrases (not case sensitive) 
see [up to 3 words] opposite cf[.] [up to 3 words] opposite 
overleaf cf[.] [up to 3 words] on page 
see [up to 3 words] on page cf[.] [up to 3 words] above 
see[up to 3 words] above cf[.] [up to 3 words] below 
see[up to 3 words] below cf[.] top 
see top cf[.] bottom 
see bottom cf[.] page 
  
see page, see p., see pp. 
3.25 Query all dashes/hyphens in REF material that stand in for author name 
Text of query: CE: Please replace dashes with complete text of author/editor name (even 
if repeated) 
3.26 Query any of the following phrases: ibid., op. cit., loc. cit., idem, art. cit., id., 
ead. 
Text of query: CE: Please replace this abbreviation with a consistent short title. 
3.27 Query any CT, FMCT, or BMCT that consists only of one of the following 
words: Introduction, Summary, Conclusion 
Text of query: CE: Please query author to provide a descriptive rather than generic title 
for this chapter 
  
Information Processing in Mood Disorders 
Jonathan P. Roiser and Barbara J. Sahakian 
Abstract 
This article discusses the central role of information processing in mood disorders, distinguishing 
“cold” (emotion-independent) from “hot” (emotional-dependent) cognition. Impaired cold 
cognition, which appears in the core diagnostic criteria for both depressive and manic episodes, 
is a reliable finding in mood disorders. There is good evidence that cold cognitive abnormalities 
remain in remission, predict poor response to treatment, and are present in unaffected first-
degree relatives of patients with mood disorders, suggesting that they are not simply 
epiphenomena of extreme mood states. Abnormal hot cognition is also a consistent finding in 
mood disorders. Mood-congruent affective biases and disrupted reward-processing have 
commonly been reported; the latter is especially relevant for understanding anhedonia. This 
pattern of disrupted hot and cold cognition is consistent with a cognitive neuropsychological 
model of depression, which proposes a central role for fundamental information-processing 
abnormalities in generating symptoms. 
Keywords: depression, bipolar, mania, hot cognition, cold cognition, cognition, 
cognitive, emotional bias, reward, antidepressants 
Introduction 
Mood disorders are common, distressing, and debilitating conditions that are frequently 
chronic or recurrent. Common evidence-based treatments include medications, such as 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) in unipolar depression and lithium in 
bipolar disorder, and psychological treatments, such as cognitive behavioral therapy 
(CBT). This chapter argues that abnormal information processing (here referred to simply 
as “cognitive processing,” or “cognition”) in mood disorders is fundamental to the 
genesis and treatment of symptoms. The types of relatively basic cognitive processes 
discussed in this chapter are quite different from the high-level constructs, such as 
dysfunctional attitudes and faulty reasoning (Beck, 1967; see Chapters 13 and 35 herein), 
that form the basis of traditional cognitive models of mood disorders and associated 
  
treatment approaches such as CBT. In particular, this chapter considers information 
processing as assessed by objective neuropsychological or cognitive neuroscience tests, 
rather than by clinical observation, structured interviews, introspection, or self-report 
questionnaires. However, rather than being seen as in opposition, these perspectives on 
cognition in mood disorders should be considered complementary and related to one 
another: the lower-level processes (bottom-up processing, or “negative perceptions”) may 
act as building blocks for higher-level constructs (top-down processing, or “negative 
expectations”), which can themselves act as a scaffold for information processing, in turn 
influencing lower-level processes. 
Why are these basic cognitive processes important in mood disorders? Our 
theoretical perspective is that what is commonly described and experienced as “mood” is 
really the summation and interaction of different types of cognitive processes (both 
lower- and higher-level) (Roiser, Elliott, & Sahakian, 2012). According to this 
perspective, understanding depression is impossible without understanding the 
information-processing abnormalities that drive it. This chapter will present evidence 
that, similar to some high-level cognitive constructs (see Chapter 13), basic cognitive 
abnormalities both predate and persist beyond mood episodes; that some (but not all) 
basic cognitive abnormalities are directly influenced by common pharmacological 
treatments; and that basic cognitive abnormalities may have a partly genetic basis. 
Consistent with this emphasis on the importance of information processing in 
mood disorders, standard diagnostic frameworks such as in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5), highlight basic cognitive processes. 
For example, in the criteria for a major depressive episode: Criterion 8 states that a 
  
depressed individual may have “diminished ability to think or concentrate,” suggesting 
impaired working memory and attention; while Criterion 2 is anhedonia, defined as 
“markedly diminished interest or pleasure in . . . activities,” implying deficient reward-
processing. The criteria for a manic episode include distractibility (Criterion 5), 
suggesting attentional impairment, as well as elevated goal-directed activity (Criterion 6) 
and risky behavior (Criterion 7), implying excessive reward-processing. Thus, basic 
information processing is fundamentally altered in mood disorders, changing patients’ 
perception of and interaction with the environment, including the social environment. 
This cognitive impact has a huge influence on their ability to function, whether in the 
workplace, at school, or at home. 
Disrupted cognitive processing in mood disorders also has important treatment 
implications. Several studies report that marked cognitive impairment predicts poor 
response to antidepressant medication, independent of baseline symptom severity (Potter, 
Kittinger, Wagner, Steffens, & Krishnan, 2004), and that cognitive enhancers can aid 
recovery in both unipolar and bipolar depression (Goss, Kaser, Costafreda, Sahakian, & 
Fu, 2013). Moreover, certain information-processing abnormalities may prevent severely 
ill patients from deriving full benefit from psychological treatments, since the latter often 
require patients to engage in difficult “executive” processes, such as problem-solving and 
counterfactual thinking. Finally, in some depressed patients, cognitive abnormalities may 
not resolve completely with treatment, continuing to cause social and occupational 
impairment even during remission (Hasselbalch, Knorr, & Kessing, 2011). Consistent 
with such a trait-like feature, cognitive abnormalities have also been reported in first-
degree relatives of patients with mood disorders, especially bipolar disorder; hence, they 
  
may be useful in identifying at-risk individuals (Olvet, Burdick, & Cornblatt, 2013) as 
well as in searching for the neurobiological underpinnings of the disorder. This 
perspective accords with the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain 
Criteria initiative, which emphasizes the importance of refocusing research into the 
causes and treatments of mental health problems along neurobiological axes, including 
objective behavioral measures (Insel et al., 2013). 
In this chapter, we distinguish between “hot” and “cold” cognition. “Hot 
cognition” occurs on tests that have an emotional impact on the individual completing 
them, either because the stimuli presented are intrinsically emotionally salient (e.g., 
emotional words, faces, scenes, music), or because feedback on the participant’s 
performance results in an affective state (e.g., satisfaction or disappointment). “Cold 
cognition” refers to information processing in the absence of any emotional influence. 
Theoretically, cold cognition is engaged on tests where the stimuli are emotionally 
neutral, and either feedback is not provided or the outcome of the test is not 
motivationally relevant (though motivational influences could certainly turn a cold test 
“hot”; see “Causal Relevance of Cold Cognition in Mood Disorders” below). It is 
important to note that the distinction between hot and cold cognitive processing is not the 
same as that between “bottom-up” and “top-down” processing, as both could be either 
hot or cold. For example, recognition memory for non-emotional objects would be 
primarily a cold bottom-up process; planning a series of chess moves would engage cold 
top-down processing; categorization of emotional faces would be primarily a hot bottom-
up process; while pessimistic expectations during a high-stakes gambling game would 
  
represent an example of hot top-down processing. Most cognitive tests, whether hot or 
cold, involve a mixture of bottom-up and top-down processing. 
Cold Cognition 
Cold Cognitive Impairment Is Common in Mood Disorders 
Disrupted cold cognition is a well-established feature of both depression and bipolar 
disorder. Reliable impairments on pencil-and-paper assessments commonly used to 
assess function in neurological patients have been observed in depression from the 1970s 
onwards. Whereas some early studies adopted a classical neuropsychological case-series 
approach (Cavenar, Maltbie, & Austin, 1979), comparing individual patients against 
population norms to identify deficits considered to be clinically significant, group case-
control designs were more common. By the mid-1990s, numerous comparisons of 
depressed and non-depressed participants on cognitive measures had been reported, 
particularly on memory tests. 
Burt, Zembar, and Niederehe (1995) performed the first systematic review of this 
literature, including nearly 100 case-control investigations of memory in depression. This 
meta-analysis identified deficits in depressed patients in the range of d = 0.27 (small) to d 
= 0.67 (medium-to-large), varying across outcome measures (“d” here refers to Cohen’s 
classic measure of effect size: the standardized difference between group means). 
However, several of the constituent studies included participants with organic 
neurological illness; or they did not match the groups on important demographic 
variables such as age and educational level, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions. 
A later meta-analysis by Veiel (1997), utilizing more stringent inclusion criteria, 
identified higher effect sizes for memory, in the range of 0.83 to 0.97 (large), and 
  
additionally reported differences in domains of cognitive function other than memory. 
Performance on tests in the domain “attention and concentration” was, according to 
Veiel’s analysis, relatively unimpaired in depressed patients (though see below for further 
discussion of this surprising finding). 
Large deficits on cold cognitive measures, especially on tests of memory and 
executive function, have also been reported in patients with bipolar disorder. These 
deficits were evident during the euthymic state, as well as during manic or depressive 
episodes (Bourne et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2006). The magnitudes of the deficits 
observed in bipolar disorder are generally larger than those observed in unipolar 
depression, but smaller than in schizophrenia (Krabbendam, Arts, van Os, & Aleman, 
2005). Deficits have typically been found to be greatest during the manic phase. Whereas 
the known negative impact of mood-stabilizing medication on cognition may be an 
important confounding factor in studies of bipolar disorder (Roiser et al., 2009; Wingo, 
Wingo, Harvey, & Baldessarini, 2009), cognitive impairments have also been reported in 
unmedicated patients and in unaffected relatives of bipolar patients (Olvet et al., 2013), 
especially in the domains of episodic memory and executive function. 
The advent of theoretically based computerized cognitive tests in the 1990s 
provided an important methodological advance in understanding cognition in mood 
disorders. One example of this approach is in the use of the Cambridge 
Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB: see www.cantab.com). Broadly 
consistent with the results from pencil-and-paper studies, those obtained with the 
CANTAB provided evidence of impairments on a wide variety of tests in depressed 
patients, including not only memory and executive function (Elliott et al., 1996), but also 
  
attention (Swainson et al., 2001). (Recall that it was in the domain of attention that 
Veiel’s 1997 meta-analysis yielded a null result.) This pattern was confirmed in a recent 
meta-analysis of studies using the CANTAB. Moderate- to large-sized deficits were 
evident on almost all measures assessed (Rock, Roiser, Riedel, & Blackwell, 2014), with 
similar patterns and degrees of impairment evident in remitted patients as well as in 
patients tested during a depressive episode. Impairments on CANTAB tests have also 
been reported consistently in patients with bipolar disorder (Sweeney, Kmiec, & Kupfer, 
2000). 
The difference in the conclusions of meta-analyses examining attention in 
depression between paper-and-pencil and computerized tests highlights a key advantage 
of utilizing computerized assessment. Computerization enables more flexible and 
temporally precise stimulus presentation than traditional neuropsychological assessments 
do, as well as more accurate measurement of response times. In the CANTAB, sustained 
attention is assessed using the Rapid Visual Information Processing (RVIP) test. In the 
RVIP subjects must, over a several-minute period, detect specific targets presented in a 
train of hundreds of successively presented stimuli, with interstimulus intervals of under 
one second. By contrast, because continuous performance paradigms are impractical to 
administer without a computer, the only measures of “attention” available to Veiel (1997) 
when he conducted his meta-analysis were variants of the digit-span test from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. The digit-span test, commonly characterized as a test 
of maintenance working memory, does not require a high degree of sustained 
concentration (and in a large meta-analysis of executive function in depression digit-span 
performance was found to be relatively unimpaired: Snyder, 2013). Therefore, the 
  
apparent discrepancy between the results reported using computerized and pencil-and-
paper measures of attention in depression is likely to be due to the fact that different 
cognitive processes were being assessed. 
Causal Relevance of Cold Cognition in Mood Disorders 
The precise theoretical significance of cold cognitive impairment in mood disorders is a 
matter of debate. Some investigators interpret the group differences described above as 
reflecting a core feature of mood disorders, and probably of central importance in their 
etiology. Others question the causal relevance of cold cognitive deficits in mood 
disorders, pointing to the potentially confounding effects of symptoms, especially the 
motivational deficits that characterize depression (Scheurich et al., 2008). In other words, 
it is possible that mood disorder patients appear to have impaired cognitive performance 
because they are distracted by symptoms, because they lack motivation, or because 
emotional responses on ostensibly cold tasks may interfere with performance (in other 
words, a “cold” task may be turned “hot”). 
Such factors probably do affect measures of cognitive impairment in mood 
disorders, but they are unlikely to account fully for the observed deficits. Meta-analyses 
have reported small-to-moderate correlations (r values in the range of 0.11–0.32) 
between the degree of cognitive impairment and symptom severity (McDermott & 
Ebmeier, 2009). However, in general, these correlations are insufficient to explain group 
differences, and might simply reflect the presence of a more severe illness in more 
cognitively impaired individuals. (See “Clinical Relevance of Cold Cognitive Impairment 
in Mood Disorders,” below.) In bipolar disorder, impairments are greatest during the 
manic phase. Importantly, though, cold cognitive deficits have also been reported during 
  
the euthymic phases of unipolar and bipolar depression (Beats, Sahakian, & Levy, 1996; 
Boeker et al., 2012), suggesting that they are not simply epiphenomena of extreme mood 
states. It should be noted that there is evidence that ostensibly “cold” tasks may be turned 
“hot” in depression, such that patients may become discouraged in the face of negative 
feedback, leading them to exert less effort, or even to give up entirely (which Beats et al., 
1996, termed a “catastrophic response to perceived failure”; see also Elliott, Sahakian, 
Herrod, Robbins, & Paykel, 1997). However, such feedback-related effects are unlikely 
to provide a complete explanation for abnormal cold processing in depression, since 
impairments have also been observed on tests that do not feature explicit feedback. 
Clinical Relevance of Cold Cognitive Impairment in Mood Disorders 
Although standardized cognitive assessments are not often used to aid diagnosis or 
treatment for patients with mood disorders, cognitive impairment could serve as a useful 
clinical indicator; for example, predicting severity, the likelihood of responding to 
treatment, and the risk of future relapse. There is evidence that cognitive impairment is 
more marked in patients who have a more severe form of illness, such as those whose 
disorder is more chronic (Hasselbalch, Knorr, Hasselbalch, Gade, & Kessing, 2013), 
more recurrent (Kessing, 1998; Robinson, & Sahakian, 2008), or characterized by more 
severe symptomatology during episodes (McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009). Depressed 
patients who have experienced more episodes also exhibit greater deficits in social and 
occupational functioning (Coryell et al., 1995), which are related to absenteeism and 
presenteeism at work (Beddington et al., 2008). 
Cold cognitive deficits may also interfere with the effectiveness of treatments for 
depression. Most of the research on this question has been focused on elderly patients 
  
(reviewed in Pimontel, Culang-Reinlieb, Morimoto, & Sneed, 2012). For example, Story, 
Potter, Attix, Welsh-Bohmer, and Steffens (2008) reported that more cognitive 
impairment was associated with less improvement with antidepressant medication in a 
sample of elderly depressed patients. Deficits in executive function appear to be 
particularly reliable predictors of poor treatment response in geriatric samples 
(McLennan & Mathias, 2010). On the basis of such findings, Alexopolous and colleagues 
developed a form of psychological therapy specifically tailored to boosting problem-
solving in geriatric depression (Alexopoulos, Raue, Kanellopoulos, Mackin, & Arean, 
2008), which was found to be more effective than supportive therapy when used as an 
adjunct to standard antidepressant treatment (Arean et al., 2010). This is consistent with 
complementary evidence from trials using the cognitive enhancer modafinil as an adjunct 
to standard pharmacological treatment in younger patients to improve symptomatic 
response in both unipolar and bipolar depression (Goss et al., 2013). However, as none of 
the trials addressing this issue have included cognitive assessments, the mechanism 
driving this effect remains to be clarified. Finally, enhancement of cold cognitive 
processing is a plausible explanation for the antidepressant effects of novel brain-
stimulation therapies, such as transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (Kalu, 
Sexton, Loo, & Ebmeier, 2012) and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) 
over the prefrontal cortex (George, Taylor, & Short, 2012). For example, one study found 
that treatment-resistant depressed patients who had improved attentional control after a 
single rTMS session (when mood effects were not yet apparent) showed the greatest 
symptomatic improvement following stimulation sessions over the succeeding two-week 
period (Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, Leyman, & Baeken, 2009). 
  
Hot Cognition 
Emotional Biases in Mood Disorders 
It is well established that depressed individuals exhibit more negatively biased responses 
than healthy volunteers on tests of emotional processing (see Roiser et al., 2012, for a 
review). These tests are usually variants of cold cognitive assessments, adapted to include 
emotionally valenced stimuli—for example, memory tests in which the stimuli are 
emotional pictures, or categorization tests that ask subjects to distinguish different types 
of emotional faces. An important and reliable complementary finding has been that 
never-depressed individuals generally exhibit positively biased responding, which may 
reflect a degree of resilience to negative emotional information. Therefore, it is most 
accurate to state that depressed individuals generally exhibit a more negatively biased 
pattern of responding than healthy volunteers. In some instances, this might be 
manifested overall as a preferential processing of negative relative to positive stimuli in 
depression, whereas in others there may simply be no difference in the processing of 
positive and negative stimuli in depressed individuals, but a marked positive bias in 
healthy volunteers. 
Such negatively biased patterns of responding in depressed individuals, both 
medicated and not on medications, have been reported on tests of emotional perception 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2006), memory (Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992), attention 
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), and working memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). For 
example, on the CANTAB Affective Go/No-go test, on which subjects must respond to a 
specified category of emotional words while inhibiting responses to a different category, 
Murphy and colleagues (1999) demonstrated that, whereas control individuals responded 
  
slightly more quickly to positive than to negative target words, the converse was true for 
depressed patients. This pattern was described by the authors as a “mood-congruent 
processing bias.” Another study using this test identified negative biases in unmedicated 
depressed individuals (Erickson et al., 2005). Few studies of emotional bias in unaffected 
relatives of patients with unipolar depression exist, but in general, the findings are 
consistent with those obtained with depressed individuals (Mannie, Bristow, Harmer, & 
Cowen, 2007). Other relevant work in this area has identified negative biases in 
individuals scoring high on neuroticism, which is a risk factor for depression (Chan, 
Goodwin, & Harmer, 2007; Rijsdijk et al., 2009). These findings are important from a 
theoretical perspective because they suggest that basic biases in emotional processing are 
not simply driven by symptoms, but may instead be important in their genesis (see “A 
Cognitive Neuropsychological Model of Depression” below). 
Findings on tests of emotional bias in bipolar disorder are more mixed, and as 
might be expected, results vary considerably, depending on the phase of the disorder. In 
the same study utilizing the Affective Go/No-go test described above (Murphy et al., 
1999), manic patients were shown to exhibit a mood-congruent positive bias, responding 
more quickly to positive stimuli. Attenuated subjective intensity of sad faces (Lennox, 
Jacob, Calder, Lupson, & Bullmore, 2004) and impaired recognition of negative 
expressions (Lembke & Ketter, 2002) have also been reported in manic patients. 
Complementing these results, some studies in bipolar patients have reported negative 
biases when assessments were administered while the patients were in a depressive 
episode (Holmes et al., 2008). However, other investigators have failed to find mood-
congruent biases in manic (Gray et al., 2006) or depressed (Rubinsztein, Michael, 
  
Underwood, Tempest, & Sahakian, 2006) bipolar patients. Positive biases, negative 
biases, and null results have all been reported in bipolar patients who were not exhibiting 
pronounced manic or depressive symptoms at the time of testing (Gopin, Burdick, 
Derosse, Goldberg, & Malhotra, 2011; Rock, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010). In samples at 
genetic risk for bipolar disorder, both positive and negative biases have been reported 
(Brand et al., 2012; Gotlib, Traill, Montoya, Joormann, & Chang, 2005). 
Reward and Punishment Processing in Mood Disorders 
In contrast to the extensive literature on emotional biases in mood disorders, 
abnormalities in reward and punishment processing have received attention only 
relatively recently (see Eshel & Roiser, 2010, for a comprehensive review relating to 
unipolar depression). This is surprising, given the conceptual links between reward and 
punishment processing and several symptoms of mood disorders. Anhedonia, closely 
related to reward processing, is one of the cardinal symptoms of the depressive 
syndrome. It is particularly important to understand, as it reliably predicts poorer 
response to standard antidepressants (Uher et al., 2012). Other symptoms of mood 
disorders that are likely to be related to reward and punishment processing include 
difficulty in decision making (in depression) and increased goal-directed activity and 
excessive engagement in pleasurable activities with potential for harmful consequences 
(in mania). 
Although reward processing has not been studied extensively in patients with 
mood disorders, some consistent findings have emerged. Importantly, a finding discussed 
above—that depressed patients are hyper-sensitive to negative feedback (Elliott et al., 
1997)—has been confirmed using tasks designed specifically to assess this process, in 
  
both unipolar (Taylor Tavares et al., 2008) and bipolar (Roiser et al., 2009) depressed 
patients. Other studies reported hypo-sensitivity to positive feedback in unipolar 
depressed patients (Henriques & Davidson, 2000), or reduced learning from rewarding 
stimuli (Robinson, Cools, Carlisi, Sahakian, & Drevets, 2012). In euthymic bipolar 
disorder some investigators have identified hypo-sensitivity to positive feedback 
(Pizzagalli, Goetz, Ostacher, Iosifescu, & Perlis, 2008), while others have demonstrated 
biased learning, depending on whether the most recent episode was manic or depressive 
(Linke, Sonnekes, & Wessa, 2011). 
The studies discussed above utilized tasks on which subjects must learn 
probabilistic stimulus–outcome associations on a trial-and-error basis. Other tests have 
probed the impact of explicitly providing information about probabilities, rewards, and 
punishments during risky decision-making in patients with mood disorders. One of the 
first studies to examine this question used the CANTAB Cambridge Gambling Task 
(Rogers et al., 1999), which requires participants initially to choose which of two 
outcomes they think will occur, and then to stake points on their decision. The subject is 
informed in advance of the probability of winning. A consistent finding across medicated, 
unmedicated, and remitted samples is that depressed individuals increase their stake with 
increasingly better odds (termed “risk adjustment”) to a lesser extent than controls do 
(Murphy et al., 2001; Rawal, Collishaw, Thapar, & Rice, 2013). Interestingly, impaired 
risk adjustment has also been reported in bipolar patients in the manic (Murphy et al., 
2001) and depressed (Roiser et al., 2009) phases. Bipolar patients also have a greater 
tendency to bet against the odds on this and other gambling tasks, irrespective of current 
mood status (Adida et al., 2011; Rubinsztein et al., 2006). Other studies have 
  
demonstrated impaired motivation in unipolar depression, using effort-based tasks where 
subjects must respond quickly in order to achieve rewards (Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, 
& Zald, 2012). 
An important development in understanding reward- and punishment-processing 
in mood disorders (and in neuroscience more generally) is the use of mathematical 
models to better characterize reward- and punishment-driven behavior. This 
computational modelling approach involves specifying an algorithm describing how 
participants are thought to perform the task, and then using this algorithm to predict 
behavior under different task conditions. The models include a small number of 
parameters, and patients’ parameter values are estimated from their measured behavior 
(e.g., choices or reaction times). These parameters may then be compared between the 
groups instead of, or in addition to, the raw data summary statistics such as average 
reaction time or percent correct. Importantly, these models can distinguish specific 
aspects of reward processing behavior (e.g., appetite for risk or subjective value of 
rewards) that would not necessarily be accessible using standard analyses of the raw data 
(Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012). 
Using such a computational approach, Chase and colleagues (2010) demonstrated 
that reward learning on a probabilistic task was not specifically impaired in depression 
per se, but instead was associated with anhedonia in non-depressed as well as in 
depressed individuals. In a reanalysis of previously published data, Huys, Pizzagalli, 
Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) built a sophisticated model to demonstrate that a deficit in 
sensitivity to feedback, rather than reduced learning, better explained observed 
differences in reward processing between depressed and non-depressed participants. 
  
Their results, obtained on the task employed by Pizzagalli et al. (2008), also indicated 
that anhedonia, as much as depression, accounted for the findings. 
A Cognitive Neuropsychological Model of Depression 
An important theoretical implication of the abnormal information-processing findings in 
mood disorders highlighted in this chapter relates to neurocognitive models of the causes 
of depressive symptoms. In the classic cognitive model of depression proposed by Beck 
(1967), depression results from stable, self-reinforcing, dysfunctional negative schemata, 
which are established as a result of early life experience and targeted by 
psychotherapeutic approaches such as CBT. This model explains emotional biases and 
disrupted reward processing in depression in terms of top-down influences from 
schemata, or what could be conceptualized as “negative expectations.” In other words, 
depressed individuals exhibit slower responses to happy words (Erickson et al., 2005), or 
misinterpret facial expressions as sad (Joormann & Gotlib, 2006), precisely because they 
expect to encounter a negative environment. According to this account, “schematic 
processing” results in more efficient processing of negative stimuli, resulting in biased 
reaction times, memories, or choices. Such negative expectations, which include 
dysfunctional attitudes and negative attributional styles, may be considered a form of 
“top-down” hot cognition. Interventions such as CBT focus on breaking negative 
schemata; for example, through challenging their logic, a process that could be 
conceptualized as training depressed individuals to exert cold cognitive control over their 
top-down negative biases. 
This classical cognitive perspective does not explicitly incorporate any role for 
the neurotransmitter systems targeted by antidepressant drugs, such as serotonin, 
  
noradrenaline, and dopamine, in the pathogenesis of depressive symptoms. However, 
there is clear evidence that transmission in these neuromodulator systems can profoundly 
influence the bottom-up processing of emotional stimuli, instantiating what could be 
conceptualized as “negative perceptions.” Manipulating monoamine transmission 
experimentally can alter reward and emotional processing biases, in both healthy 
volunteers and depressed individuals (Roiser et al., 2005; Roiser et al., 2008). Similarly, 
genetic variants that affect these systems (e.g., the serotonin transporter linked 
polymorphic region: 5-HTTLPR) are associated with biased emotional information and 
reward processing (Fox, Ridgewell, & Ashwin, 2009). According to this account, 
negative biases occur in depression due to disrupted monoamine modulation of the 
critical neural circuits that process incoming emotional stimuli (Harmer, Goodwin, & 
Cowen, 2009). Harmer and colleagues have proposed that it is precisely these kinds of 
bottom-up biases that are targeted directly by antidepressant drug treatment, allowing the 
gradual resolution of symptoms over time (see Harmer et al., 2009, and Chapter 18). 
Our cognitive neuropsychological model of depression (Roiser et al., 2012) 
proposes an integrated approach, accommodating both the classical high-level cognitive 
framework and more recent psychopharmacological findings. In both the classic 
cognitive model and our neuropsychological model, negative schemata play a central 
role, but their origins are different in the two frameworks. We propose that bottom-up 
biases (negative perceptions), influenced by disrupted monoamine transmission, play a 
causal role in the development of dysfunctional negative schemata, but that the latter 
themselves also engender top-down biases (negative expectations), which contribute to 
the maintenance of schemata. The cognitive neuropsychological model also proposes a 
  
central role for a type of impaired cold cognition in depression, executive function: 
negative perceptions may feed and maintain dysfunctional negative schemata especially 
when executive function is impaired. Importantly, these different cognitive processes 
(negative perceptions, negative expectations, and executive function) are probably 
instantiated via the (dysfunctional) operation of separate, but interacting, neural circuits. 
Importantly, this model can be used to understand different types of treatment 
approaches in depression. As explained in greater detail in Chapter 18, in this model, 
antidepressants can be understood as primarily influencing biased, hot, bottom-up 
processing (negative perceptions), thereby reducing or eliminating the occurrence of 
negatively biased inputs that had been reinforcing the depressed individual’s 
dysfunctional negative schemata. In this way, the contents of the negative schemata may 
be resolved indirectly. But schemata may not resolve by themselves if impairment in 
executive function remains, and there is little evidence that antidepressants improve cold 
cognition. This may explain why cognitive enhancers, as well as rTMS and tDCS of the 
prefrontal cortex, can augment the response to antidepressant drug treatment. By contrast, 
psychotherapy (especially CBT) in this model is conceptualized as directly targeting 
biased top-down processing (negative expectations), through altering negative schemata. 
However, resolution of schemata may be difficult if their negatively biased inputs remain 
intact. 
If our model is correct, and different treatment modalities address complementary 
aspects of negatively biased processing in depression, this may provide an explanation 
for why antidepressants and CBT in combination are more effective than either in 
isolation, at least in the short run (Forand, DeRubeis, & Amsterdam, 2013). Moreover, 
  
insofar as patients may differ in the presence and malleability of top-down versus 
bottom-up hot processing, this model could provide a heuristic that will guide research 
into why different patients may respond to different treatments. Finally, this model can 
account for the effects of a novel surgical intervention, deep brain stimulation (DBS), in 
the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex. Neuroimaging studies suggest that this region, 
which shares strong reciprocal connections with the amygdala and is part of the brain’s 
basic emotional processing circuitry, plays a critical role in instantiating bottom-up 
negative biases in depression (see Grimm et al., 2009, and Chapter 19) and even operates 
abnormally in genetically at-risk individuals (O’Nions, Dolan, & Roiser, 2011). 
Therefore, DBS may alter bottom-up negative biases in depression directly by 
manipulating the brain circuits that subserve them. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed evidence supporting the roles of both hot (emotion-dependent) 
and cold (emotion-independent) information processing in mood disorders. Unipolar and 
bipolar patients exhibit reliable impairments on cold neuropsychological tests, and the 
presence of such impairments during remission and in patients’ unaffected first-degree 
relatives suggests that these are not simply epiphenomena of extreme mood states. Mood-
congruent emotional and reward biases are commonly reported in mood disorders, and 
the finding that these can be altered directly by pharmacological intervention suggests 
that they result primarily from bottom-up influences. Our neuropsychological model of 
depression (Roiser et al., 2012) provides an integrated account of disrupted hot and cold 
cognition in depression. It also has implications for understanding established treatments 
such as psychotherapy and medication, as well as novel brain stimulation-based 
  
treatments such as rTMS, tDCS, and DBS. This perspective encourages us to take a 
holistic approach to treatment, including pharmacological, psychological, and 
psychosocial methods, to improve functional outcome and to prevent depression from 
becoming chronic and relapsing. Abnormal hot and cold information processing could be 
used as a form of early screening (Owens et al., 2012), since 75% of mental health 
disorders start before the age of 24 (Kessler et al., 2005). This would facilitate earlier 
treatment or even the prevention of depression, stopping it from becoming a lifelong 
disorder that robs people of their mental capacity and well-being (Beddington et al., 
2008). 
Future Directions 
Mitigating cold cognitive dysfunction in mood disorders is an unmet need, especially in 
treatment-resistant patients. It will be important to test whether boosting executive 
function pharmacologically is clinically useful in large-scale trials. It also remains 
unclear whether cold cognitive impairment predicts poor response to psychotherapy, and 
whether cognitive dysfunction could be used to predict the onset of mood disorders in 
high-risk individuals. As well as providing important clinically relevant information, 
studies addressing these questions would test a central prediction of the cognitive 
neuropsychological model: that cold cognitive impairment is a cause, as opposed to a 
consequence, of symptoms. With respect to hot cognition, the cognitive 
neuropsychological model suggests that it may be possible to predict which patients are 
most likely to respond to pharmacological versus psychological treatments, by measuring 
bottom-up and top-down hot cognitive biases. Finally, currently used antidepressants 
generally have little direct impact on the brain’s dopamine system, which plays a critical 
  
role in reward processing. There is a clear rationale for developing dopamine-based 
treatments to improve symptoms related to motivational processing and decision-making. 
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